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THE PROBLEM OF PROVING FOREIGN LAW
By ARTHUR NUSSBAUM t
THE FACT THEORY. JUDICIAL NOTICE
THE phrase "foreign law is a fact," or "foreign law must be proved
as a fact," is well known both in common law countries1 and on the
Continent,' and traceable back at least to the eighteenth century.' During
the last century this "fact" theory has lost much of its popularity in
civil law countries, but in America and in other common law jurisdic-
tions it still dominates cases,4 legislation,' and literary discussion." In-
deed, Professor Beale has recently called the fact theory "the funda-
mental premise" underlying the rules for proving foreign law.
7
Each law can be considered as a fact insofar as it is a controlling
force in society; but when law and fact are contrasted, foreign law is,
of course, law. However, foreign law is not always on equal terms with
the law of the forum. Although courts are expected to know their own
law, they cannot be expected to know the law of other countries. Hence
litigating parties must prove the applicable foreign law to the court.
t Research Professor of Public Law, Columbia University.
1. See, e.g., Church v. Hubbard, 2 Cranch 187 (U. S. 1804) ; Nashua Say. Bank
v. Anglo-American Co., 189 U. S. 221 (1903); Los Angeles Iv. See. Corp. v.
Joslyn, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 370 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co.
[1918] 2 K. B. 623, 667 (C. A.); Lazard Bros. v. Midland Bank [1933] A. C. 289, 297
(H. L. 1932) ; RoscoE, EVIDENCE (Henderson's 20th ed. 1934) 86, 121; DICEy-KErrI,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed. 1932) 860; CHESHIRE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 129.
2. For citations from German, French and Italian Literature see BOSSUARD, DIv.
AUFGAE DES RICHTERS BEI DER ANWENDUNG DES AUSLNDISCHEN Rtcnrs (1929) 12.
Many earlier cases, principally Latin, are listed in LA LOGGIA, LA ESECUZIONE DELLE
SENTENZE STRANIERE (1902) 307, n. 1. See Langenbeck, Beitrdige -ur Lehre von Bewise
frenider Rechie vor inldndischen Gerichten (1858) 41 ARCHIV FIOR DIE CIVILISTISCIlE
PRAxis 129.
3. It appears, e.g., in Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 174 (K. B. 1774); and in
Prussia: ALLGEMEINE GERICHTSORDNUNG FOR DIE PREUSSICTHEN STAATrEN (1793) part
I, tit. 10, § 53. Lessona, La preuve des lois &trang res (1895) 27 REvvE DE DR. INT. E'r
DE LEGISLATION COMPARAE 545, 547 cites PACIANO, CUI INCUMIIBAT ONUS PROBANDI
(Francos 1631) bk. 1, c. lxvi, no. 51 as asserting that foreign law must be proved by the
parties.
4. See, e.g., Surgan v. Parker, 181 So. 86 (La. App. 1938); Alexander v. Gray,
181 So. 639 (La. App. 1938); Nickles v. Fenner & Beane, 59 Ohio App. 33, 17 N. E.
(2d) 283 (1938) ; Copeland v. Craig, 193 S. C. 484, 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940).
5. N. Y. CIv. PRc. ACT § 391, and other American statutes cited in Wimom,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2558, n. 1 (hereinafter cited as WIGMORE).
6. See, e.g., STUM.ERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 157; GOODRICHI, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1938) 194; authorities cited note 1 supra, note 7 infra.
7. 3 CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 1664.
PROBLEM OF PROVING FOREIGN LAW
Since courtroom proof is generally limited to questions of fact, it is
conceivable that in the minds of lawyers foreign law has become assimi-
lated to fact.
The particular persistence and strength of the fact theory in common
law countries seem to have an historical basis. English courts at first
were unwilling to apply foreign law at all; they preferred to decline juris-
diction in foreign law cases.8 The idea that in a given situation the
foreign law, for instance, the legal rate of interest in a foreign country.
might be factually significant paved the way for a more liberal attitude
in receiving evidence of foreign law, the rationale for which was ex-
pressed as follows by the United States Supreme Court: "Those [ foreign]
laws pervade all transactions which take place where they prevail, and
give them their color and legal effect."'
The fact theory has encountered considerable opposition. On the
Continent, it gave particular offense to the nineteenth century inter-
nationalist school. Savigny, the founder of this school, had proclaimed
the doctrine that recognition of foreign legal systems is a corol-
lary to the equality between nationals and foreigners demanded by the
Law of Nations.'0 Later writers, in the spirit of this conception, asserted
that courts must take judicial notice of foreign law; that even where the
foreign law is not pleaded, judges are under a duty to ascertain it
through research of their own." This theory, which became dominant
in continental literature,'12 is dictated by high ideals, but it seems hardly
practicable. The formidable burden it throws upon the courts is dispro-
S. See discussion of early English cases in Sack, Conflict of Laws in the History
of English Law in 3 LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESs (1937) 342, 387, 388.
9. Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1915). See also Gray v. Gray, 87 N. H.
82, 87, 174 AUt. 508, 510 (1934) : ". . . a part of the facts consists in the law under
which the transaction took place." Of course, domestic law similarly gives "color" to
domestic transactions but this color is not perceived because it does not stand out
against its environment.
Undiscerning adherence to the "fact" theory has even led to the proposition that for-
eign law must be determined by the jury, although this body is obviously unfit for this
intricate judicial task. WG!toR § 2558; Comment (1932) 30 MiH. L. Rmv. 747. This
unsound extension of the "fact" theory has now been practically abandoned, and will not
be considered in this Article. Nor will there be considered the doctrine according to
which mistake of foreign law is regarded as a mistake of fact. WILsro, CoNrmcrs
(1937 ed.) § 1592.
10. 8 SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RO-AIISCHEN RECHTS (1849) § 348 [tr. by Guthrie under
the title PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1880) 69].
11. See BOSSHARD, Op. cit. rupra note 2, at 40, 63, and writers referred to by
LA LOGGIA, op cit. supra note 2, at 309, n. 1; cf. also cases cited infro notes 13, 14.
12. See, e.g., VoN BAR, THEORIE UND PRAXIS DES INT. PRIVATRECTITS (18I9) [tr. by
Gillespie under the title THEORY AND PRcrIcE OF PRIvATE INr. LAv (1892)] n. 37;
2 LAURENT, LE DR. CIvIL INT. (1881) 485; PiLErr, PRrNcIPES DE DR. Ii.r. Pnx t (1903)
84; Mtmi, DAs INT. CIVILPRO ESSRECHT (1905) 134; Resohltions of the Institut de Dr.
Int. in 1891 (1892) 11 ANNUAME 330.
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portionate to whatever advantages the system possesses. This method
has influenced the courts mainly in Germany13 and Holland 14 where judges
widely possessed a reading knowledge of foreign languages. Other con-
tinental tribunals have required the litigating parties to come forward
with proof of the foreign law which they wish the court to consider.1"
Although the common law countries have never taken much stock in
the internationalist view of foreign law, a strong movement against the
proof-by-the-party rule has developed in the United States on a different
basis. Most of the foreign law questions in this country have arisen in
connection with the law of a sister state rather than of a foreign country.
In our national system, with its widespread communication facilities and
extensive publication of legal materials, it seems quite unnecessary to
regard sister states as "foreign" states and to require that the laws of
neighboring jurisdictions be proved by the cumbersome courtroom rules
of evidence. In most cases, it will be quite easy for a reasonably well
equipped American court to inform itself fully about the law of a sister
state.
For this reason American jurisdictions in the last two decades have
been shifting to legislation requiring the courts to take judicial notice of
the laws of the sister states. A Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
Act was promulgated in 1936 and so far has been adopted by eleven
states. 16 At least fourteen others have similar statutes of an independent
13. Jan. 30, 1889, 23 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN 33;
March 23, 1897, 39 id. at 376; May 24, 1921, 102 id. at 214; Nov. 14, 1929, 126 id. at 202.
This practice has been adopted by the Austrian Supreme Court in the judgments of July
30, 1931, Die Rechtsprechung 1932, 1 (with informative annotation by Wahle); Nov.
18, 1931, id. 1932, 132.
14. Supreme Court of the Netherlands, April 8, 1927, Nederland'sche Jurisprudentie
1927, 1110; March 20, 1931, id. 1931, 890.
15. France: Court of Cassation, April 2, 1910, Journal de Dr. Int. 1910, 1200;
Nov. 19, 1912, id. 1913, 583; earlier cases cited in BOQUEL, DE L'OFFICE DAY JuC.n EN
MATIARE 'APPLICATION DES Lois P.TRANGAREs (thesis, Nancy, 1923) 92, 93, Excepted
are French statutory provisions or treatises prescribing the taking of judicial notice;
cf. 1 PiLLET, TRAiTE PRATIQUE DE DR. INT. PRIVfk (1923) 141. Italy: Court of Cassation,
May 23, 1930, Foro Italiano 1931, I 968; Dec. 19, 1933, id. 1934, I 402; Jan. 29, 1936,
id. 1936, I 1083. In Switzerland the rule has been embodied in cantonal legislation.
Federal Tribunal judgment of Nov. 24, 1933, 60 AmTLICHE SAMLUNG I 433; SCHNITZ-
LER, HANDBUCH DES INT. PRIVATRECHTS (1937) 85. The cantonal Acts are binding upon
the federal courts. In both Italy and Switzerland the court may apply foreign law which
it knows, though there is no proof by the parties.
In its extreme form the internationalist doctrine disallows proof of foreign law by
the parties, who, however, may informally collaborate with the court. BossIlARn, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 63.
16. Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota. 9 UNIFOuIm LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1939) 88, gives
the statutory citations. For an analogous Canadian development see WIGMoan § 2573,
n. 16.
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type,'" and in two states the judicial notice principle has been introduced
by the courts."8 Very few of the larger states now abide by the old com-
mon law rule, and the federal courts take judicial notice of the laws of
the various states.' 9 Most of the cases prior to 1920 were influenced
by mechanical difficulties, now overcome, in the ascertainment of the law
of sister states, and no longer represent the law on this subject. Un-
fortunately, nearly all treatises on the subject still discuss tile proof of
foreign law in terms of past principles, citing superseded cases as the
present law and giving the new statutory development just the honor of
mention. The Conflict of Laws Restatement ignores the judicial notice
rule.20
Much of the old law has, of course, been preserved. For example,
adoption of the judicial notice rule does not imply that the parties are
released from pleading the foreign law.21 Making an informal reference
to foreign law during the course of hearings is not sufficient.-2 Observance
of rules of pleading is necessary, as the Uniform Act recognizes, so
that the adverse party will have sufficient time for preparation of his
defense.' Still, where the judicial notice rule has been adopted, tie
17. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia (GA. CODE ANx. (Park Supp. 1926)
§ 5818), Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Tennessee (Trn..
CODE ANN. (Shannon 1917) § 5586), Virginia, Vest Virginia, Wisconsin. For statutory
citations not given here see WVIGIMORE § 2573, n. 16; for New York see note 26 infra.
18. Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N. H. 126, 155 Ad. 47 (1931). In In re Holden's Estate,
110 Vt. 514, 1 A. (2d) 721 (1938) the judicial notice rule %was applied, though it was errun-
cously based upon the Vermont proof of foreign statutes act, in ra p. 1025. See, however,
Hillmer v. Grondahl, 109 Vt. 388, 199 AUt. 255 (1938).
19. 3 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1686. In respect to the law of foreign countries,
it may be hoped that the federal courts will follow the state rule in the spirit of Sampson
v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C A. 1st, 1940).
20. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAws (1934) § 621 states without qualification
the proof-by-the-party rule. § 621, comment d remarks that "several states" take judicial
notice of the law of another state.
21. Silverman v. National Assets Corp., 12 A. (2d) 3S9 (Del. Ch. 1940); Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of America v. Shumaker, 12 A. (2d) 618 (Md. 1940) ; Smith v. Brown,
19 N. E. (2d) 732 (Mass. 1939) ; Greear v. Paust, 202 Minn. 633, 279 N. W. 563 (1938) ;
Baker v. Sovereign Camp, 233 Mo. App. 13, 116 S. W. (2d) 513 (1938); Hifler v.
Calmac Oil Co., 10 N.Y. S. (2d) 531, 538 (Sup. Ct. 1939); In re Barclay's Estate,
1 Wash. (2d) 82, 95 P. (2d) 393 (1939). Contra: Tuttle v. Jockmus, 106 Conn. 683,
138 AUt. 804 (1927); Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 366, 10 P. (2d) 63, 65 (1932),
(1936) 24 CAL. L. REv. 311; Suskin v. Hodges, 216 N. C. 333, 4 S. E. (2d) S91 (1939).
The pleading requirement is a familiar proposition of the earlier continental doctrine.
See Langenbeck, op. cit. supra note 2, at 132, 134; von BAn, op. cit. supra note 12,
at n. 37. See also p. 1035 infra.
22. Esmar v. Haeussler, 341 Mo. 33, 115 S. W. (2d) 54 (1938) snble.
23. Section 4 provides: "Any party may present to the trial court any admissible
evidence of such [foreign] laws, but to enable a party to offer evidence of the [foreign]
law or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to
the adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise."
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requirements as to pleading foreign law should be kept in bounds. It is
unwarranted to demand, for instance, that the parties set out a foreign
statute in haec verba.24
At the trial, the judicial notice rule does not mean that the parties
have no burden of going forward with evidence of the foreign law. Some
proof should be introduced. Just how much is necessary seems to be a
question of convenience as between court and counsel. The question has
been officially considered in Massachusetts. Members of the Massa-
chusetts bar "seemed to think that the statute . . . shifted the whole
burden of the question to the court." Thereupon the Judicial Council
recommended that the courts adopt a rule making it the duty of counsel
"to call to the attention of the court such authorities or other material
relating to the question [of foreign law] as they wish the court to
consider."2 The New York statute explicitly makes it the duty of the
parties to go forward with some evidence of the foreign law; the court's
own research is therefore merely supplementary.20 But this is not a
material divergence from the general line of the judicial notice statutes
and New York essentially belongs with the jurisdictions following the
judicial notice rule."
There are certain rather important distinctions among the states which
have adopted the judicial notice rule. Most of the statutes, including
the Uniform Act, are mandatory ("the court shall take judicial notice") ;
only a few are permissive.28 The Uniform Act and a majority of the
individual state enactments confine judicial notice to the laws of sister
states.29 An exception to this rule is Massachusetts, in which by a man-
datory statute of 1926 the courts are required to notice judicially the
laws of foreign countries 3°-a requirement reminiscent of the conti-
24. As was required in Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1933) ; accord,
Bennett v. Myres, 21 S. W. (2d) 943 (Mo. App. 1929). The foreign rule need only be
stated specifically enough to substantiate the cause of action or defense pleaded. The
rigid rulings antedating the judicial notice statutes listed in Note (1922) 18 A. L. R.
1197 can no longer be considered as controlling.
25. (1939) 24(4) MASS. L. Q. 8.
26. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr, § 391; see Cherwien v. Geiter, 272 N. Y. 165, 5 N. E.
(2d) 185 (1936).
27. In Mencher v. Goldstein, 240 App. Div. 290, 269 N. Y. Supp. 846 (2d Dep't
1934); Smith v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 160 Misc. 417, 290 N. Y. Supp. 471 (Sup. Ct.
1936) ; Shaw v. Blainey, 154 Misc. 495, 277 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Mun. Ct. 1935) the courts
denied any duty to take judicial notice of foreign law. In these cases the parties had
not pleaded or proven foreign law at all, but this point was not discussed in the very
broad language of the courts.
28. Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee.
29. See statutes cited notes 16, 17 supra. The judicial notice rule is one of the few
issues upon which American practice as to sister state laws and international conflict
rules diverge.
30. MASS. GEN. LAWS (Ter. ed. 1932) c. 233, § 70.
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nental internationalist theory. In fact, the Massachusetts law was enacted
under the influence of a theorist, Professor James B. Thayer."1 It does
not appear, however, that he was acquainted with the continental doc-
trine; he derived his ideal of coordinating domestic and foreign law
from the impractical proposition that foreign law is just as much a fact
as is domestic law.' The Massachusetts Judicial Council called the enact-
ment a "pioneer step which we believe to be in advance of any other
English-speaking jurisdiction."313 Apart from the fact that several states
already had similar statutes, 34 later events do not bear out this claim.
The Uniform Act rejected the Massachusetts theory and limited its scope
to jurisdictions in the United States. While the Massachusetts statute
is praiseworthy for its extension of the judicial notice rule to foreign
law in a state where library facilities are adequate for this task, it seems
unfortunate that the rule has been cast in a mandatory form. The flexi-
bility of the New York rule, which permits a court to notice the laws
of foreign countries when it finds it convenient to do so, seems much
more desirable.3 5
It thus appears that adoption of the judicial notice statutes has not
eliminated the duty of the litigants to present evidence of foreign law;
the statutes have merely supplemented and liberalized the practice at
common law. But American courts, apart, perhaps, from a few New
England states,36 have thus far failed to make even this limited use of
their new powers despite the mandatory form of some of the enactments.
Judicial conservatism has checkmated the legislative attempts at reform
in this field by over-stressing pleading requirements and by other means.
Neglect on the part of legal writers to analyze, appraise, and make
familiar the new statutory law has contributed greatly to this unfortunate
situation.
TECHNIQUES OF PROVING FOREIGN LAW
If foreign law is to be regarded as a fact and hence subject to the rules
of proof, it certainly must be proved by evidence of a sort vastly different
from that which is employed to prove ordinary facts. But with only a
31. PnRumaNxARY TRATISE oN EVIDECE (1898) 257; (1939) 24(4) MASS. L Q. 8.
32. In Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N. H. 126, 130, 155 Ati. 47, 50 (1931) Thayer's theory
is used in order to review the lower court's findings on foreign law; see p. 1034 infra.
33. (1939) 24(4) MASS. L. Q. 8.
34. Aiss. CODE Axx. (Hemingway, 1917) § 735; VA. CovE AN. (Michie, 1936)
§ 6192a (enacted in 1918).
35. The mandatory form of the rule, together with its extension to foreign countries,
has been adopted by North Carolina. N. C. CODE Ax. (1939) § 1749a.
36. New Jersey and Michigan also have this "permissive" form of the rule; see
note 17 supra. In Connecticut, at least, the judicial notice rule is of old standing. See
Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 360, 370 (1847).
19411 1023
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
single venerable exception,"T the cases have tended to tie the methods
of proof of foreign law to the Procrustean bed of the fact theory. The
courts have insisted upon archaic methods of proof despite the vast im-
provements of the last fifty years in making legal sources available
throughout the world.
In England, oral testimony by expert witnesses, the method used for
proof of facts, still seems to be practically the only admissible form of
evidence of foreign law." The English cases on the subject are largely
concerned with the process of qualifying expert witnesses. Treatises on
Evidence and on Conflict of Laws devote considerable space to this ques-
tion, but the precedential value of the decisions is very slight, as whether
or not a particular witness qualifies as an expert depends more or less
on the surrounding circumstances." Originally, the best evidence rule
required that written law be proven by the production of an authenti-
cated copy of the statute or decree, 40 but since the Sussex Peerage case41
it has not been necessary to produce an authenticated copy of foreign
written law, oral proof by experts subject to cross-examination being
regarded as preferable.
The development of methods of proof in the United States has been
affected by the close legal and commercial relations existing between the
various states. While American courts originally followed the old English
rule which required authentication of foreign statutes, 2 today, under
recent state enactments, a copy of a statute or decree contained in an
official publication4" or in a publication commonly recognized 44 by the
courts of sister states, is regarded as prima facie evidence of the foreign
law. This rule is applied in almost all American jurisdictions, particularly
37. De Bode's Case, 8 Q. B. 208, 250-254 (1845).
38. See 1 ROSCOE, EVIDENCE (Henderson's 20th ed. 1934) 121; VIGMORE §§ 1271,
2090a.
39. For the cases see WIGMIORE §§ 564, 690.
40. WIGMORE §§ 1271, 2090a. Authentication had to be made under the seal of
the foreign nation; Church v. Hubbard, 2 Cranch 187, 237 (U. S. 1804); Hill v.
Packard, 5 Wend. 375 (N. Y. 1830). In Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173 (N. Y.
1829) the French consul, testifying to French law, laid before the court a copy of the
Code de Commerce furnished him by his government. This was held not to be receivable
proof.
41. 11 Cl. & Fin. 85, 115 (H. L. 1844).
42. WIGMORE § 1271.
43. This phrase will be used in this article as an abbreviation for "printed books
or pamphlets containing the foreign law and purporting to be printed or proved to
have been published by the authority of the foreign jurisdiction." UNIFORM PROOF OF
STATUTES ACT §378; see N. Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT §391.
44. This phrase will be used as an abbreviation for "publications proved to be coin-
monly recognized in the foreign courts." UNIFORM PROOF OF STATUITS ACT §378,
N. Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 391.
Older cases tended to spurn the convenience offered by this rule (which in New York
dates back to 1848). See Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N. Y. 41, 54 (1880).
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in those states which have adopted the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act
of 1920." The Uniform Act, as well as several independent state stat-
utes, 6 has extended the rule of admissibility to the written law of foreign
countries. The proof of unwritten law 47 is still based on oral testimony,
but several states provide that the printed case reports are to constitute
prima facie evidence of the unwritten law. 48 Under the language of the
New York Act, a court taking judicial notice of foreign law is limited
to the use of statute books and case reports, but there seems no doubt
that the Act does not preclude the use of legal treatises and commen-
taries, for purposes either of evidence or of judicial notice. That the
use of these works is permissible is now well settled, although their ad-
missibility is based upon several diverse theories.4' Certainly there are
no better guides for one seeking information on civil law than the leading
treatises or, perhaps for German law, the leading commentaries. An
American court would probably permit an expert witness to read from
treatises in court, but texts might also furnish appropriate instrumen-
talities for judicial notice.
Oral testimony on foreign law in this country is supplied in much the
same way as in England, except insofar as the English courts require
the expert to be a professional lawyer or a person (such as a consul)
whose occupation necessarily involves familiarity with the branch of law
under examination." American tradition has been more liberal on this
score5" because it has been more difficult in this country than in England
to find the proper sort of experts on foreign law. The recent influx of
continental lawyers to this country may tend to tighten the require-
ments. But the chief test of an expert's qualification should be the worth
of the testimony which he presents. In many cases it would not do much
45. Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Washington. For references see 9 Urxroa LAWS AN. (1940 Supp.) 230.
46. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tex-as, Vermont, Wisconsin. For
references see WVIGMoR § 1684, n. 15.
47. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 391 speaks of the "unwritten or common law!' This
coordination is not accurate in respect to Civil Law. Gemehnes Recht means the modern-
ized Roman law in force in parts of Germany prior to the Codes; droit commnun is sim-
ply the counterpart of droit particulier (special law).
48. N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr §391; ILT. Ray. STAT. (1939) c. 51, §48 (does not
include reports of foreign countries) ; OHIO CODE ANN. (Baldwin, 1940) § 11499.
49. WIGMORE § 1697(b) ; see, e.g., Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N. H. 126, 132, 155 Ad.
47, 51 (1931) ("textbooks and treaties may be consulted").
50. See American and English cases listed in WIGMORE §§ 564, 690; 3 BFA.nE, op. Cit.
supra note 7, at 1673f.
51. Liberality has been statutory as well as judicial. See, e.g., CAt. CODE CMv. Pan-.
§ 1902 (requiring merely that witness be skilled in the foreign law).
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harm to reserve decision on the issue of qualification until the alleged
expert has shown the extent of his knowledge of the subject at hand.
With respect to written foreign law, the courts have been given power
by recent statutes to dispense with oral testimony,52 but this power has
scarcely been used in cases involving the law of a foreign country. It is
perhaps understandable that the courts in those cases desire the thorough
exegesis offered by the interplay of direct and cross examination. Yet
judges, at least in New York, insist upon the introduction both of expert
oral testimony and of the official or judicially recognized editions of
foreign statutes. The latter requirement may often be unreasonable. In
the province of civil law, official editions are usually very difficult to
procure, if they are available at all. But most civil law codes and statutes
appear in private editions which can be much more easily obtained and
which give the texts as accurately and much more conveniently than do
the bulky official editions. Private editions, in fact, are the everyday
tool of the continental lawyer, who only in exceptional cases turns to the
official Law Gazettes. But one might question whether those private
editions satisfy the American statutes' requirement of being "commonly
admitted as evidence of the existing law" in foreign tribunalsY3 In the
English courts, on the other hand, the expert may testify from private
editions of any sort.54 Professor Wigmore has recommended that mat-
ters of this sort be left to the general discretion of the courts."" It seems
quite conceivable that American courts could adopt the discretionary
English rule without finding it necessary to alter the statutes now in
force.56
Turning to the methods of proving foreign law employed on the Con-
tinent, we meet with an entirely different picture. It is true that sworn
oral testimony by "doctores" is mentioned as an ultimate method of
evidence of unwritten foreign law by as early .a writer as the Italian,
Peregrinusy" and that many recent continental writers on proof of foreign
52. See, e.g., N. Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT § 391.
53. As a matter of fact, the statutory phrase is inapt for civil law literature, since,
strictly speaking, the generally used editions-e.g., the leading German commentaries-
are not "admitted as evidence of the existing law" by the foreign courts; rather they are
employed so as to benefit from opinions and references given by the annotators or
commentators.
54. 1 RoscoE, EvIDENCE (Henderson's 20th ed. 1934) 122.
55. WIGMORE § 1271.
56. N. Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT § 391, e.g., where it might be said that the mode of
introducing presumptive evidence of written law, set forth in the first sentence, is not
the only method.
In Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 254 N. Y. Supp. 439 (3d Dep't 1931) a
witness was permitted to rely dn a private edition of the Italian Codice Civile, there being
no objection by the parties.
57. 3 CONSILIA con. XI, §§ 27-37, a work not available to the present writer. Pere-
grinus lived from 1530 to 1616. The citation is taken from 1 CATELLANIS, IL Diarrno
INT. PRIVATO (2d ed. 1895) 341.
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law make mention of the admissibility of oral testimony, 8 a principle
recently confirmed by the Italian Court of Cassation.59 Yet despite the
careful canvassing of cases by La Loggia co and other authors, the present
writer is not aware of a single continental case in which oral testimony
was actually given. Fr. Stein, the leading commentator on the German
Code of Civil Procedure, calls the hearing of experts on any kind of
law "entirely improper" ("durchaus umangemessen"), since interpreta-
tion and application of rules of law are the exclusive province of the
judge.6'
Apart from the proof of the texts of foreign statutes, judgments, and
treatises, written statements by authorities and experts form the normal
means of furnishing continental evidence on foreign law.' In modem
times, statements by public officials have become more important In
1877, Mancini, then Italian Minister of justice, said in a frequently
cited 63 parliamentary speech which represents the continental view: "The
best way [to prove foreign law] is to present the text of the law, or
rather a statement by competent authority which certifies the exact word-
ing and its actually being in force."
58. Usually in questions of customary law, foreign or domestic. See, e.g., MicMaM,
LE R6LE DU JUGE DANS L'APPLICATIO" DES Lois fTRAXOPES (thesis, Paris, 1907) 48:
BossHARD, op. cit. s itpra note 2, at 80; and particularly Mittermaier, Ober den Beu, is
auslIdndischer Gesetze (1835) 18 AxcHrv F0R DIE CIVIaLSTIscsE PRAxIs 67. In civil law
doctrine, customary law is considered as an extra-judicial product of society-a question
of fact to be proved by witnesses. Anglo-American common law, however, can only be
ascertained by juridical analysis; it presents, as was early recognized by Mittermaier,
a different evidential problem. He refers to a Prussian Royal Ordinance of December
8, 1819 instructing the courts to require as evidence of English law authenticated opinions
of two English lawyers certified to be men of reputabl standing.
59. Judgment of Jan. 24, 1936, Foro Italiano 1936, I 1083, regarding American law.
The doubt expressed by Mittermaier, supra note 58 was not raised by the court.
The archaic "stipulated" oath by the party, a continental inheritance from Roman
law, is generally held inapplicable to the proof of foreign law, as is proof by "admission"
(confession). See, e.g., F. STEIN, Zn1LPaozE.ssoRxuo (Jonas' 14th ed. 1928) 1293;
MicARD, op. cit. supra note 58, at 36. An American counterpart is that a denmurrer does
not admit an allegation on foreign law. Finney v. Guy. 189 U. S. 335 (1903) ; Knicker-
bocker Trust Co. v. Iselin, 185 N. Y. 54, 58, 77 N. E. 877, 878 (1906). But see Com-
ment (1906) 20 HAv. L. Rav. 74.
60. Op. cit. supra note 2.
61. FR. STEIN, op. cit. supra note 59, at 844. Similar objections have been raised
by BoQum., supra note 15, at 105.
62. This practice, too, can be traced back to the times of Peregrinus. See note 57
supra.
63. Even judic,.lly. See A\ppellate Court of Aquila, June 19, 1928, Rivista di
Diritto Int. 1929. F94. Italian courts have repeatedly applied the label of documentary
evidence to l.ro,,t f foreign law. Court of Cassation of Torino, April 23, 184, quoted
in 1 FioRE, DR. ' N. PRrvE (19C7) 206; Appellate Court of Genoa, Dec. 11, 1893, La
Legge 1894, 1 891: Italian Con: t vt Cassation, Dec. 19, 1933, Foro Italiano 1934, I 4017
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Two types of official statements must be distinguished. In one situation,
legislatures may authorize their consuls, or ministries of Justice or other
governmental agencies, to furnish information on domestic law for use
in foreign courts willing to accept such information in evidence ;04 Euro-
pean governments have repeatedly bound themselves by treaty to confer
such authority upon their ministries of Justice and to have their courts
recognize statements of a similar agency of the other government."
Secondly, courts may receive in evidence statements on foreign law by
research institutes or foreign-service authorities of their own country:
for instance, Italian courts admit statements by Italian consuls concern-
ing the law of the country of their mission."; Statements of the second
sort are frequently occasioned by direct requests from the court to the
informing authority. In important cases, the parties will probably still
submit opinions ("consultations," "pareres") by "doctores. ''1 7 In any
case, the plastic nature of the civil law of Evidence permits easier adapta-
tion to the needs of the individual case than is found in common law
systems. There may be also active and even intensive research by the
court, particularly in countries like Germany and Holland, which have
fully accepted the principle of judicial notice. Judicial research of this
sort may result in an informal and cooperative proceeding of great
efficiency.
A comparison of the civil law and common law systems seems to show
that the common Ilaw practice of admitting oral testimony, with an op-
portunity for cross examination, permits a more thorough investigation
64. See BossHARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 74; Rechtshilfeordming fur Zivilsachen
(1931) PREUSSISCHES JUSTIZMINISTERIALBLATT 302, § 34 and passin. Courts, except
Swiss Courts, do not issue such statements. BOSSEARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 77. Art. 410
of the Code Bustamente, 2 NiBovr & GouLf-, RECUEIL DES TExTs USUaLS DE DROIT
INT. 508, provides for judicial statements on the text and interpretation of the laws of the
country to which the court belongs.
A judgment of the Civil Court of Buenos Aires, April 19, 1926, digested in (1929)
ZEITSCHIRIFT FUR AuSIUNDISCHES UND "INT. PRIVATRECIIT 394, wisely holds that a
foreign consul may deliver and authenticate the text of foreign laws, but has no authority
to certify the validity or invalidity of a legal transaction.
65. German treaties of this type are listed in NUSSBAUm, DEUTSCHES INTERNATION-
ALES PRIVATRECHT (1932) 100, n. 5; Italian treaties in MORELLI, IL DIRITo PROCESSUALE
CiVmE INT. (1938) 57.
66. Appellate Court of Parma, Nov. 30, 1909, Rivista di Diritto Int. 1909, 482,
Appellate Court of Aquila, June 19, 1928 id. 1929, 594. A statement on Moroccan law
issued by the German Embassy in Madrid was used by the Reichsgericht, Dec. 13, 1911,
78 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN IN ZIVILSACHEN 190. For other cases, see MIcARn. op. Clt. su pra
note 58, at 52-54.
67. Art. 409 of the Code Bustamente, supra note 64, provides that foreign law
may be proved through authenticated attestations from two lawyers of the foreign
country, an unsatisfactory rule strangely reminiscent of the Prussian Ordinance of 1819,
supra note 58. Section 34 of the Prussian Rechtshilfeordnung, cited su pra note 64, points
out that in most cases the German diplomatic or consular representative would be able to
procure opinions from competent foreign legal experts.
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into the foreign law. But it is doubtful that this method leads to greater
clarity. A remark of Judge Learned Hand seems applicable to many
instances in which an expert on foreign law takes the stand: "The testi-
mony of the expert was exceedingly confusing, not due to any fault
of his, but inevitable because of the attempt to import into the French
law the refined notion which pervades our own . . . "8 The difficulties
inherent in all testimony on foreign law are greatly increased by the
common law procedure which requires that the expert display a full
command of the English language. A carefully prepared written state-
ment by an expert on the foreign law, translated, if necessary, by an
official translator, seems to be a much more satisfactory device for setting
forth the foreign law. It is the writer's impression that under the present
practice of the courts, skillful advocates may succeed in developing con-
fusing divergencies between experts on purely verbal matters in situations
where coherent and well-substantiated written opinions would eliminate all
difficulties. Furthermore, the common law system is saddled with the
difficulty of finding qualified experts who are available to testify; this
difficulty increases with the distance of the place of trial from the great
metropolitan centers, and is inversely proportional to the importance of
the legal system involved; experts on Swiss, Bolivian or Iraq law are
much rarer than those on English or German law. The cost of acquiring
an expert may become extremely burdensome, a fact which imposes a
heavy penalty for invoking the foreign law."
American procedure approaches the continental system in cases in
which written affidavits of foreign law are admitted into evidence.7" Now
68. Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Gdntrale Transatlantque, 43 F. (2d) 941, 942
(C. C.A. 2d, 1930).
69. Letters Rogatory, little used, in any event, in relation to foreign countries, are
not issued, it seems, for the purpose of ascertaining a foreign law. Among other obstacles,
the absence of legal compulsion to make lawyers testify on their law may be a factor.
If the foreign lawyer is willing to testify, Letters Rogatory are not needed. The right
of a party to have the court designate a commissioner to take depositions on foreign law
abroad was recognized in Boyer v. Kuerzi, 87 App. Div. 605, 84 N. Y. Supp. S63
(2d Dep't 1903), but the recent statutes raise the question whether this is still the law,
at least where other means of evidence are available. On the latter point, see Geoghegan
Y. Atlas S. S. Co., 16 Daly 229, 10 N. Y. Supp. 21 (Com. P1. 1890). Actual use of such
commissions does not appear from the cases. Deposition on foreign law before a United
States consul abroad seems a workable method but is not employed because of legal
uncertainties; see WmGmRE § 1295a. The costs of a proceeding abroad, which involves
the retention of foreign counsel or heavy travelling expenses, will deter most litigants
from this procedure.
70. See Tradesmen's Nat. Bank v. Cummings Bros., 157 Ad. 386 (N. J. 1931);
Italiano v. Rosenbaum, 246 App. Div. 687, 284 N. Y. Supp. 177 (1st Dep't 1935);
Stern v. S. S. Steiner, Inc., 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 44 (Sup. Ct. 1939). The writer under-
stands that affidavits on foreign law are received in New York probate practice. CaEsn-
iaE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 132 refers to expert evidence by affidavit ithout giving
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that foreign law can be judicially noticed, there seems to be no reason
for objecting to a sworn or unsworn affidavit. Even prior to the judicial
notice rule there was at least one reported case of unsworn statements
by foreign legal experts being considered by an American court.71 The
theory underlying this free admissibility, both here and in similar con-
tinental cases, may be that statements of foreign law form part of the
pleadings and may, at least if uncontroverted, be utilized by the court.
But the civil law system of admitting statements by foreign govern-
mental agencies does not seem to have been adopted in English or
American courts. Attempts by Parliament to permit introduction of
statements by foreign courts as evidence of foreign law have completely
failed in practice.72 It should be emphasized, however, that resolute em-
ployment of the principle of judicial notice may offer an excellent medium
for liberalizing the orthodox approach of American courts and make
the process of examining foreign law more elastic and more efficient. 8
FINDINGS ON FOREIGN LAW
Beset with peculiar problems as is the process of gathering foreign
law material, the process of drawing conclusions from that material may
likewise require efforts beyond the judge's daily routine. He will have
to demonstrate his analytical faculties in an unfamiliar and intricate
situation. It is well known' that in most cases the experts presented by
the litigant parties hopelessly contradict each other. The judge will both
have to balance the qualifications of the contending experts and determine
the point of foreign law on the basis of juridical appraisal. Where the
testimony of one side is uncontroverted, English law, still influenced by
the fact theory, places limitations upon the court's right of independent
scrutiny,74 which do not exist in American law. Adoption of the principle
particulars. Wigmore does not mention the matter. See also McRae v. Mattoon, 10
Pick. 49, 55 (Mass. 1830).
71. Gould v. Gould, 119 Misc. 845, 192 N. Y. Supp. 572 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (a former
French Premier, Viviani, was among the experts).
72. British Law Ascertainment Act, 1859, 22 & 23 Vicr., c. 63; Foreign Law
Ascertainment Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vicr., c. 11. The 1859 Act has been used a few times
in English-Scotch relations, but even here considerable difficulties have developed.
Macomish's Ex'r v. Jones [1932] Sess. Cas. 208. See generally, DiCEY-KErrEI, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 862.
73. Resort to judicial notice may be very helpful in circumventing rigid statements
on admissibility made in prior cases. See, however, Smith v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 160
Misc. 417, 290 N. Y. Supp. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1936), cited supra note 27 and itlra note 99.
74. The-judge is confined to the material referred to by the expert but he may
examine the law in question to see if the expert's interpretation is proper. Russian Comm,
& Ind. Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse [1923] 2 K. B. 630, 643; CusislxiRr,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 132.
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of judicial notice means that the court can make its own independent
juridical analysis; the New York and Uniform Law types of the judicial
notice rule do not differ on this point. In addition, the judicial notice
statutes, in permitting the courts to forego expert testimony on foreign
written law, clearly imply that judges may use their own judgment in
considering the language of statutes or other written law 7 - a judicial
power which has never been questioned on the Continent.
There have inevitably been a few instances in which courts, because
of errors in translation or for other reasons, have made incorrect
findings of foreign law.7 6 But another development has been far
more serious: courts forced to apply foreign law under their Conflict
of Laws rules have again and again avoided using an unwelcome foreign
rule by reading into it arbitrary territorial and other sorts of limitations
which removed the situation at bar from the range of the rule.71
The question may even arise as to whether a forum may invalidate
a foreign law. On Conflicts principles, the power of the forum is co-
terminous with the power of an ordinary law court of the foreign
country. Consequently the forum may hold a foreign statute invalid on
grounds which are determined judicially in the foreign law. This view
has surprising results. It is possible, for instance, for a non-American
court, applying American law, to declare an American statute unconsti-
tutional as violating the due process clause. In a suit against the Austrian
Government, based upon its American loan of 1930, tried before an
Austrian court of first resort, the government relied on the American
Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, abrogating gold clauses. The claimant
invoked the due process clause. The unfortunate Austrian court stated
that the due process clause is merely constitutional law, not "substantive
law"; and that for this reason the court could not consider it78 - a very
75. This has frequently been done. Instances of independent examinations of foreign
law are Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (1934) ;
Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N. Y., 280 N. Y. 286, 20 N. E. (2d) 758 (1939),
49 YAix L. J. 324; Masacco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 254 N. Y. Supp. 439 (3d
Dep't 1931).
76. See Appellate Court of Douai, Jan. 27, 1925, Jour. Dr. Int. 1975, 393; 1 Fn=ux-
ENSTEIN, INT. PRIVATREcT (1926) 292; Lewald, Le Contric des Cours Suproncs sur
l'applicafion des lois ftrangbres (1936) 57 ACAO mE DE D. INT., RMc. aes Courts, 205,
280; BossH~A, op. cit. supra note 2, at 86. Some of the judgments alleged, however,
may be classed as debatable.
77. Instances are listed in Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in thc
Conflict of Laws (1940) 49 Y.AaE L. J. 1027, 1039 c seq. See also Buchanan v. Rucker,
9 East 192 (K. B. 1808); Central Hanover Bank v. Siernans & Halske, 15 F. Supp.
927 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) [cf. Nuss tum, Mo-Eav 1% ma LAW (1939) 491, n. 16];
Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance Soc. [1938] A. C. 224.
Systematic scrutiny probably would yield many other cases.
78. Bezirksgericht Vienna, Inner District, March 1, 1934, Die Rechtsprechung 1934,
82 with ann. by Wahle.
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obscure piece of reasoning indeed." Apparently the court, unable to find
a sound legal argument, tried to escape, corite que collte, an action as
presumptuous as invalidating the Gold Clause Resolution. This reticence
on the part of the court is very laudable. Invalidation on constitutional
grounds should be left to courts acting under the constitution in question.
To this writer's knowledge, there has never been an instance of judicial
invalidation of a foreign statute but this seems to be the result of judicial
tact and expediency rather than of legal compulsion. 0
A valid legal limitation upon the forum's power may result from the
force of foreign judicial decisions. In the first place, it is obvious that
a civil law (or any other) forum applying the rules of a common law
legal system must respect the rule of precedent even though the forum
itself does not possess such a rule."' But even where the applicable
foreign law is that of a civil law country, the forum must conform to
the views of the foreign courts. Despite the lack of the rule of precedent,
the decisions of the highest continental courts do practically set the course
of the law in their respective countries. Those highest courts are ex-
tremely reluctant to change a "jurisprudence ficxe" ("feststehende Rechi-
sprechung," "giurisprudenza constante"). Actually, the chief difference
between civil law practice and stare decisis is that the former does not
attribute authoritative effect to decisions of the appellate courts gener-
ally, but only to pronouncements of the highest courts.
The noted French writer, Pillet, asserted the view' that following
foreign precedents "subordinates" the domestic courts to the foreign
courts, thus impairing national independence.8 2 A strange outgrowth of
the sovereignty complex! It is true that the sovereign state, through its
Conflict of Laws norms, is free to prescribe or to prohibit the application
of foreign law. To the extent, however, that the forum agrees to apply
foreign law, a sound phase of the fact theory of foreign law displays
itself. The "color" which the foreign law gives to a foreign trans-
action is a product of the actual conditions surrounding the transaction
and should be given full respect by the forum. In the words of the
Hague court, "It is French legislation as applied in France which really
constitutes French law."8 3  Common law courts, irrespective of stare
decisis, naturally ascertain foreign law from the judgments of the foreign
79. Possibly the court took Verfassungsrecht (constitutional law) in the European
sense as a part of public law not applicable under the rules of Private International Law.
80. For an extensive discussion of the problem see Niboyet, Qu'csi-ce que la loi
itrangre aux yeux des juges d'un pays determini (1928) REVUE Du DR. INr. Er DE
LEGISLATION COMPARAE 753.
81. This was recognized by the Appellate Court of Hamburg. Judgment of May
5, 1934, in DIE DEUTSCHE REcHTSPRECHUNG AUF DEM GEDiETE DES INT. PRIvATmRcuTS
IM JAHRE 1934 (1935) 8.
82. 1 Tp, An PRATIQUE DE DR. INT. PrvIe (1923) 153.
83. Cases of Serbian and Brazilian Loans, P. C. I. J., Ser. A, No. 20/21 (1929) 46.
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tribunals,"4 and there are no instances of French courts having followed
Pillet's advice."' But in a number of cases, German and Austrian courts,
interpreting foreign law more magisterially than judicially, have placed
their conception of the foreign law above the opinion of the highest
court of the foreign country."s This practice has been especially prevalent
in cases in which the pertinent statutes of the forum and the foreign
country were uniform. But even in this situation, so important in the
American set-up, the independence of foreign judicial developments
should be respected."7
FOREIGN LAW IN COURTS OF REVIEW
The technical difficulties involved in ascertaining foreign law make it
desirable that there be judicial review of decisions of lower courts (a
postulate which also furnishes an additional reason for removing the mat-
ter from the jury). In civil law countries, ordinary appellate courts may
reexamine the whole case, facts and law, foreign law therefore presents
no difficulty on this score. Difficulties arise in connection with the cassa-
tion and other civil law types of further appeal, such as the German
"Revision."8 These remedies are granted in order to relieve errors of
law; it is around this topic that the law-fact controversy in civil law
revolves. The reason for thus limiting the remedy is a desire to lighten
the burden of the highest court by confining its duties to the establish-
ment and maintenance of a uniform interpretation of the national laws,
a view obviously based on the precedent-like effect of the decisions of the
highest court. As a corollary to this policy, "cassation" and its equiva-
lents do not lie against error in the application of foreign law. Other
reasons have been asserted to support this result; the most important
of these is that it is sufficient to have one appellate court review the
84. See Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152, 160-161 (U. S. 1825): " . . no
Court in the universe, which professed to be governed by principle, would, we presume,
undertake to say, that the Courts of Great Britain, or of France, or of any other nation,
had misunderstood their own statutes, and therefore erect itself into a tribunal which
should correct such misunderstanding' Accord, in respect to courts of sister states,
Los Angeles Inv. Sec. Corp. v. Joslyn, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 370, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
Contra: Menard v. Goltra, 40 S. NV. (2d) 1053 (Mo. 1931) ; Esmar v. Haeussler, 341
Mo. 33, 115 S. W. (2d) 54 (1938).
85. Pillet himself relies on Court of Cassation, Nov. 18, 1912, Sirey 1914, I 258
where the Appellate Court had advanced an independent interpretation of the German
Civil Code. There was, however, no indication that German decisions had been discarded.
86. For examples, see NussAUa,, Op. cit. supra note 65, at 99, n. 2 and 3.
87. For a sound approach see Appellate Court of Douai, Mar. 7, 1901, Jour.
Dr. Int. 1901, 180, validating an inaccurately dated Belgian will in accordance with the
Belgian interpretation of § 970 of the Code Civil, although under the French interpretation
of the same section the will was void.
88. For a lucid and carefully documented presentation see Levald, loc. cit. snpra
note 76; cf. also LA LocGrA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 183.
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foreign law. Continental internationalist doctrine, however, advocates
extension of cassation to the foreign law,89 Austrian courts have permitted
review of foreign law" ° and, surprisingly, the doctrine has recently been
adopted by the Italian Court of Cassation. 0' However, the highest courts
of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland have
steadfastly refused to review questions of foreign law.0 2
In common law countries the review question is less momentous. In
contradistinction to its extensive discussion in continental literature, there
seems to be no discussion of the subject anywhere in common law learn-
ing except in a carefully reasoned New Hampshire case.0 3 English apathy
toward this matter is easily explainable, as the law-fact distinction is of
very little significance even in appeals to the House of Lords, which has
limited the issues brought before it more through discerning self-limita-
tion by the House than through any other factor. "4 As the English tra-
dition is widely followed by American appellate courts, reexamination
of findings on foreign law generally presents as little a problem here as
in England. But in several states, review by the highest court is ordinarily
limited to questions of law."5 In New York and elsewhere, 0 statutes
expressly provide that a court's findings on foreign law (or a charge
to the jury on this point) are subject to review on appeal; the New York
Civil Practice Act requires the trial court to include the determination of
foreign law in its findings, and it authorizes the appellate court to engage
in independent research, in the same manner as the trial court."r The upper
court should be able to conduct such research even in the absence of an
express provision of the New York type."' When the findings of foreign
law are taken away from the jury and transferred to the trial court,
it seems consistent to extend the privilege of reviewing the findings to
the highest court. It is true that a statement of the highest court on a
point of foreign law lacks the effect of precedent, not because foreign
law is regarded as a fact, 9 but because the rule of precedent has been
89. This is also Lewald's view, loc. cit. supra note 76.
90. Judgments of Dec. 1, 1926, Die Rechtsprechung 1927, 17; July 6, 1934, id. 1934,
162; May 22, 1936, id. 1936, 124.
91. Judgment of July 8, 1931, Settimane della Cassazione 1931, 1517.
92. Lewald, supra note 76, at 281.
93. Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N. H. 126, 155 Atl. 47 (1931).
94. See Attwood v. Small, 6 Cl. & Fin. 232, 301 (H. L. 1835); BENTWICH, PRIVY
CouNCIL PRAcIcE (3d ed., 1937) 205.
95. See, e.g., N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 589.
96. UNIFORM JUDICIAL NOTIcE OF FOREIGN LAWS ACT § 3.
97. N. Y. Cir. PRAc. ACT § 391.
98. See Woodward's Appeal, 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atl. 453 (1908); Tarbell v. Grand
Trunk Ry., 96 Vt. 170, 118 Ati. 484 (1922); Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N. H. 126, 155
Atl. 47 (1931).
99. The fact theory has been referred to in this connection in Smith v. Russo Asiatic
Bank, 160 Misc. 417, 290 N. Y. Supp. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1936). In Lazard Brothers v.
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limited to domestic law for historical and policy reasons. Nevertheless,
statements by the highest court may very well be used in a later pro-
ceeding, at least through judicial notice. Of course, it would be equally
objectionable to liken foreign and domestic law to such an extent that
a party could invoke the foreign law for the first time before a ciurt
devoted exclusively to reviewing matters of law. The New York law
obviates this result by permitting review only of the recorded findings
of the lower courts on the foreign law.' This provision seems wise
because the submission of foreign statutes and cases to the appellate ciurt
actually amounts to an offer of new evidence, generally not admis.,ible
before courts of review.10'
FAILuRE TO PROVE FOREIGN LAW
The Presumption Theory
The noted American case, Cuba Railroad v. Crosby, is authority for
the view that where proof of foreign law is necessary to maintain a suit
and has not been furnished, and any efforts made under the judicial
notice rule have failed, the court may order a dismissal of the complaint. °2
The plaintiff, an employee of the railroad, lost his hand through a defect
in machinery after notifying the railroad of the defect and receiving assur-
ance that it would be repaired. As no evidence was given of the law of
Cuba, where the accident occurred, the complaint was dismissed. Apart
from this case, there are few instances in which American courts have dis-
missed a complaint10 3 because of lack of proof of foreign law.1 4 In an
Midland Bank [1933] A. C. 2S9, the House of Lords held, as a rule of evidence, that
the findings on the foreign law made in another case cannot be given judicial cognizance.
It must be remembered that the judicial notice rule has not been adopted in England.
100. N. Y. Cir. PRAc. AcT § 391.
101. Lennon v. Cohen, 264 Mass. 414, 421, 163 N. E. 63, 67 (1928). The weight
of authority, however, is to the contrary. Walker v. Lloyd, 295 Mlass. 507, 4 N. . (2d)
306 (1936) ; Hite v. Hite, 301 Mass. 294, 17 N. E. (2d) 176 (1938) ; Supreme Court
of the Netherlands, April 8, 1927, Nederland'sche Jurisprudentie 197, 1110; Supreme
Court of Austria, May 18, 1933, summarized in Giurisprudenza Comparata di Diritto Int.
Privato 1934, 51. For earlier German cases see vox BAn, op. cit. supra note 12, at n. 37,
nn. 2 and 4; for a discussion of American cases see Comment (1928) 42 HAnv. L. R-v.
130.
102. 222 U. S. 473 (1912) (opinion by Mir. Justice Holmes).
103. Or overruling a defense, as the case may be. In Askanian v. Dostumian, 174
Mass. 328, 54 N. E. 845 (1899) Air. Justice Holmes dealt hypothetically with a defense,
an incident of which was the alleged omission of a protest required by foreign law.
He pointed out that the defense would fail in the absence of evidence proving the
foreign law.
104. Christie v. Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp., 214 App. Div. M0, 211 N. Y. Supp.
143 (2d Dep't 1925) (insignificant per curiam decision following Crosby case); Riley
v. Pierce Oil Corp., 245 N. Y. 152, 156 N. E. 647 (1927), see note 103 infra; Rositzki
v. Rositzld, 329 Mo. 662, 46 S. XV. (2d) 591 (1931) and other interstate cases cited
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early English case, Male v. Roberts, the plaintiff brought assumpsit for
money advanced to an infant in Scotland.'0 5 The transaction would have
been void under English law, except for so much as was used for "neces-
saries," but the plaintiff was non-suited by Lord Eldon because Scotch
law, althofigh applicable, was not put in evidence by the plaintiff.10 A
nonsuit decree was also rendered by the German Reichsoberhandelsgericht
in a case where children of a Russian decedent were allegedly liable as
heirs for the latter's debts under conditions apparently warranting the
claim under German law; the court held Russian law, which was not
proven, to control.' In the American cases dismissal seems to go to the
merits.YS
The overwhelming majority of cases have avoided the loss involved
in dismissal of the complaint or nonsuit,"'0 by the use of a variety of
devices. Where both parties relied on the law of the forum, this fact
has been used by American and foreign courts as a justification for
applying the law of the forum," 0 on the ground that the parties' conduct
infra. The possibility of "failure" for lack of proof is also indicated in Saloshin v. Houle,
85 N. H. 126, 134, 155 Atl. 47, 50 (1931).
In re Hall, 61 App. Div. 266, 70 N. Y. Supp. 406 (3d Dep't 1901), cited in Xales,
Presumption of the Foreign Law (1906) 19 HARV. L. REV. 401, 408 and by other writers,
is not a good example. The court invalidated a marriage, a rather remote incident of
the litigation, on the basis of the applicable foreign law, rather than because proof of
foreign law was lacking. Among continental writers, dismissal of the complaint is
primarily advocated by LA LOGGIA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 317.
105. 3 Esp. 163 (Com. P1. 1800).
106. The case is misapprehended by CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INT. LAW (2d ed. 1938)
216-217, where it is represented as a decision on the merits under English law.
107. Judgment of April 28, 1879, 25 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSODERHANDELS-
GERIcHTs 53 (the court was the predecessor of the Reichsgericht).
108. Explicitly in the Riley case, supra note 104, referring to N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACr
§ 482 which, however, authorizes the court in its discretion, to dismiss "without preju-
dice.' In the absence-of this useful rule, dismissal for lack of proof should be con-
sidered as going to the merits; dismissal for lack of pleading may be different, however.
109. Where the theory of a court of review implied dismissal because proof of
foreign law was lacking, the case has sometimes been remanded to the lower court.
Reichsgericht, Oct. 8, 1924, Warneyers Rechtsprechung 1925, 48; Austrian Supreme
Court, July 30, 1931, Juristische Wochenschrift 1932, 2334; Supreme Court of the
Netherlands, March 20, 1931, Nederland'sche Jurisprudentie 1931, 890. Sometimes a
court refuses to contemplate the alternative of dismissal. Thus in Marsters v. Lash,
61 Cal. 622 (1882) the court felt that in the absence of proof of the foreign law, the
court must "of necessity" resort to its own law.
110. Pauska v. Daus, 31 Tex. 67 (1868); Brown v. Wright, 58 Ark. 20 (1893);
Watford v. Alabama & Florida Lumber Co., 152 Ala. 178, 44 So. 567 (1907) ; cf. Smith
v. Muncie Nat. Bank, 29 Ind. 158, 161 (1867). This view has particularly been insisted
upon by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, judgments of May 8, 1915, 41 A.rtact=L SAMMtx-
LUNG II 268; Dec. 14, 1920, 46 id. II 493; May 9, 1923, 49 id. II 225; March 12,1925,51 id.
II 34; Oct. 26, 1937, 63 id. II 383. The German Reichsgericht holds a different view,
see cases cited infra notes 138, 140, but not infrequently deems the application of German
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implied their submission to the law of the forum."' In a number
of cases where there was no showing of reliance by both parties on the
law of the forum, but foreign law had not been proved, the law of the
forum was nonetheless applied as the only law before the court."' The
great majority of cases, however, have applied the law of the forum,
in the spirit of the fact theory, by means of "presumptions." One pre-
sumption used, mechanical in its application and sweeping in its scope, is
that, in the absence of proof of the foreign law, the court must assume
that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum."' The alleged
presumption is an obvious non sequitur and nothing but a crude fiction
disguising the substitution of the law of the forum for the unproved or
unascertainable foreign law. American courts prefer a more sophisti-
cated type of presumption which may be summarized as follows: the
law of a sister state or other common law country, if not proven, is
presumed to be the same as the law of the forum.'14 Although some
jurisdictions do not extend this presumption to statutory provisions, or
extend it only with qualifications, the presumption normally seems to
extend to statutory law," 5 with an uncertain exception for penalties and
law corroborated by the parties' reliance on German law. Judgments of Dec. 5, 1902, 53
ENTScHEoUNGEN IN ZIVILSAC N 140; Dec. 18, 1920, 101 id. 143; Oct. 29, 1927, 118 id.
283; May 19, 1928, 82 ScusranRs AicHrv 289. See also note 111 infra.
111. This theory is found particularly in the American cases, but see also Reichs-
gericht, Feb. 25, 1919, 95 ExrsCHEmUNcEN IN ZIVnLSACREu 42; 'May 19, 1928, 82
Scur =Ts Ancinv 289; Nov. 5, 1928, Juristische Wochenschrift 1929, 434 (implied sub-
mission to the law of the forum by the party favored by the foreign law).
112. Van Wyck v. Hiller, 4 Rob. 940 (La. 1842); Burgess v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 92 Tex. 125, 46 S. IV. 794 (1899) and a number of early Louisiana cases, such as
Crozie v. Hodge, 3 La. 357 (1832) and Bonneau v. Poydras, 2 Rob. 1, 13 (La. 1842);
cf. Peet v. Hatcher, 112 Ala. 514, 21 So. 711 (1896). The Reichsgericht, 'March 23, 1897,
39 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN IN ZIvLsACHEN 376; June 26, 1900, Juristische Vochenschrift
1900, 589; Nov. 22, 1901, id. 1902, 36 has ruled, without resort to presumptions, that
German law applies where the applicable foreign lav cannot be ascertained. For Swiss
cantonal cases in accord, see BossHAmx, op. cit. mspra note 2, at 109. The French,
Belgian and Italian cases cited by Darras in (1901) JouR. DR. IN.T. PnvP. 446 do not
bear out the theory under consideration, and the California cases cited by Kales, mnpra
note 104, at 411, employ presumptions contrary to the author's statement.
113. See cases cited in 3 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1680, nn. 1-7; Norris v.
Harris, 15 Cal. 226, 254 (1860); Syme v. Stewart, 17 La. Ann. 73 (1865); Blethen
v. Bonner, 53 S. XV. 1016 (Tex. 1898). ZURcIC CODE CIV. PRoc. (1913) § 100 provides
that the court "having no certain knowledge of the foreign law, may assume the foreign
law to be the same as the domestic law, unless a diversity is proved by the parties."
Other Swiss cantons have similar provisions, SCHNITZLER, HANDBUCH DES IN r. PmVAT-
RECHTS (1937) 86. The presumption was also used in various earlier decisions of
French and other Latin courts; see LA LOclA, op. cit. mpra note 2, at 316, n. 3.
114. For a detailed account see BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1675 et scq.; MM=xOn
§2536; Von Moschzisker, Prcsumptions as to Foreign L w (1926) 11 Mxx,-. L. Rzv. 1.
115. 3 BEALm, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1683 seems to consider this the minority rule.
In fact, listing a "representative decision" for each state, he cites nineteen states pro and
1941] 1037
1038 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50: 1018
forfeitures. Where the foreign law does not belong to the common law
group, the presumption is not applied except in respect to "universally
recognized fundamental principles of right or wrong in deciding between
contending parties,""' such as the obligation to carry out ordinary con-
tracts. The latter idea has a few congeners in continental law,"' but
otherwise the elaborate system of presumptions is entirely American.
The shortcomings of the presumption theory have been repeatedly
demonstrated, particularly by Professor M. M. Bigelow and by the late
Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, Robert von Moschzisker. 13 Although
the "sophisticated" form of the presumption doctrine is not so crude a
fiction as its naive, sweeping form, it is still so unrealistic that it offends
common sense. For this reason, the rule has resulted in much judicial
vacillation and uncertainty."' The view which excepts foreign statutory
law from the presumption theory is particularly objectionable in that it
represents the foreign common law system in point as thoroughly petrified
and antiquated,12 but this view has been adopted by the Restatement. "'1
nineteen contra. Among the "contra" decisions, however, there are at least three which
enunciate the presumption as to "common law," but do not involve any statute: Louis-
ville and N. Ry. v. Southern Co., 237 Ky. 618, 36 S. W. (2d) 20 (1931); Rosenblatt v.
Holstein Rubber Co., 281 Mass. 297, 183 N. E. 705 (1933); Cory v. Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 54 R. I. 144, 170 At. 494 (1934). Furthermore, Trafton v. Garnsey, 78 N. I-I.
256, 99 At. 290 (1916), and Amos v. Kelley Co., 240 Mich. 257, 215 N. W. 397 (1927),
rest on a finding that there was no foreign statute. Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg.
Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386 (1929) seems not to be in point. While Harris v.
White, 81 N. Y. 532, 544 (1880) considers the question as doubtful, two recent lower
court decisions use the narrow rule. Bernstein v. Fuerth, 132 Misc. 343, 229 N. Y. Supp.
791 (Mun. Ct. 1928); Shaw v. Blainey, 154 Misc. 495, 277 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Mun. Ct.
1935). According to Grow v. Oregon Short Line, 44 Utah 160, 138 Pac. 398 (1913) the
weight of authority is in favor of the broader rule. Moreover, the judicial notice rule
will henceforth in many cases obviate the disregard of statutes of sister states.
116. Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 194, 93 N. E. 590, 594 (1911).
117. The Reichsgericht has repeatedly asfumed that contracts are interpreted the
same way among all civilized nations, and has therefore interpreted foreign contracts
in the same fashion as German ones. Judgments of (!,:t. 30, 1907, 19 ZEITSCIIIUPT FOR
INT. RECHT 238; March 24, 1909, 71 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN IN ZIVILSACHEN 9; July 11, 1919,
96 id. 230. This view cannot be given unqualified approval. See Reichsgericht, Sept. 28,
1885, 16 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN IN ZIVILSAcHEN 338 (presumption that a certain rule on
dissolution of corporations is universal).
118. Annotations to 2 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Bigelow's 8th ed. 1883) 863a;
Von Moschzisker, loc. cit. supra note 114.
119. A particularly puzzling feature is that the courts sometimes hold the "sophisti-
cated" presumption doctrine inapplicable, only to resort to the "naive" form of tile
presumption. Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226, 252 (1860) ; Peet v. Hatcher, 112 Ala.
514, 21 So. 711 (1896).
120. In Reidman v. Macht, 98 Ind. App. 124, 183 N. E. 807 (1932) it was held that
a Kansas promissory note was not negotiable because Kansas law was not proved and
therefore common law applied. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was adopted
by Indiana in 1913 and by Kansas in 1905.
121. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 623.
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The Substantial Justice Theory
In spite of the strenuous objections which may be made to the pre-
sumption theory, the policy of applying the law of the forum in the
absence of proof of foreign law seems perfectly sound. Once the stum-
bling block of the presumption doctrine is removed, both greater clarity
of reasoning and betterment of a number of existing practices may be
expected.
As mentioned above, courts have sometimes applied, the law of the
forum when foreign law was not pleaded or proved, without resorting
to a "presumption" or any other form of reasoning. The idea that, in
the absence of proof of foreign law, the law of the forum is the o-inly
law before the court has a certain visual force, but it begs the question.
Since foreign law would ordinarily be applied in these cases under the
Conflicts rule's, the answer must explain why resort to the law of the
forum is preferred to dismissal of the action.
The opinion of the circuit court of appeals in the Crosby case points
the way to the solution. The court applied to the Cuban situation "the
law as the court conceives it to be, according to its idea of right and
justice; or in other words, according to the law of the forum."'2 Hence
in order to do justice, the court gave judgment for the plaintiff. This
was a far better method than dismissing the complaint, as the Supreme
Court did, because Cuban law was not proved. Even if the theory of
the Supreme Court in this particular case seems tenable, it can hardly
be doubted that in the vast majority of situations the law of the forum
will permit a perfectly reasonable disposition of the litigation. And the
need to apply the lex fori is particularly strong in common law jurisdic-
tions because of the difficulties and costliness involved in the ctmmon
law proof of foreign law.
A situation in which the reasons for applying the law of the forum
are particularly compelling is that in which neither of the parties has
invoked the foreign law. It has been asserted judicially that parties cannot
by agreement change the law applicable to their relationship. "An agree-
ment is not a contract, except as the law says it shall be, and to try to
make it one is to pull on one's bootstraps. Some law must impose the
obligation, and the parties have nothing to do with that; no more than
with whether their acts are torts or crimes.""'' This familiar argument12 4
122. 222 U. S. 473, 477 (1912).
123. Judge Learned Hand in Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 48 F. (2d) 115
(C.C.A. 2d, 1931).
124. See particularly 2 BE.ALE, CONFLICr OF L Aws (1935) 1079: on the other hand
see W. NV. Cook, Contracts and the Conflict of Laws (1938) 32 ILL L REV. 899. The
same objection has long been advanced and refuted in continental literature. See, e.7..
2 BROC-IFR, COUPS DE DR. INT. PRrAV (18,83) 74: vo. BAR. op. cit. su pra note 12, at
§247. Compare Meijers, L'histoire des Principes Fondamnentaur, etc. (1934) 49
ACADENIM DE DL INT. REC. DES Cotms 547, 634.
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is not convincing even in the conceptual sphere. Suppose that the legal
rules governing a sales transaction, for instance, are the sort called in
civil law "dispositive" rules, i.e., subject to alteration by the parties, and
that the legal systems under contemplation agree in allowing the parties
to alter those rules. There is no reason why the parties in fixing the
terms of their contract should not be able to choose one legal system to
the exclusion at least of the "dispositive" rules of another system. Public
policy may forbid the parties to submit to a particular foreign law, but
that is a decision' which should be made as the particular situation arises,
not on an a priori basis. In fact, in the field of contracts, both common
law and civil law courts have frequently recognized the so-called
"autonomy" of the parties, i.e., their right to select a law proper to their
contract.12 5
Fortunately, the problem before us is narrower and less troublesome
than the "autonomy" issue. We are not concerned with a contractual
accord as to the law to be applied, but only with certain procedural be-
havior of the parties. Judicial language implying an "agreement" in these
circumstances should not be taken too seriously. The important factor
from the viewpoint of substantial justice is not a question of agreement
but the reliance of the parties on the law of the forum. By placing them-
selves upon the parties' common ground, courts will satisfy both parties
- a rare opportunity - and at the same time simplify the proceeding
through eliminating the trouble of proving foreign law. This result is,
therefore, much less disturbing than are the consequences of the autonomy
theory which would ordinarily lead to the substitution of foreign law
for the law of the forum. It is true that the Conflicts rule does not come
into operation under such circumstances. But it should be realized that
the parties may just as well submit their dispute to arbitrators who
would pay little attention to the rules of the Conflict of Laws.120
On the other hand, there must be a limit to using the lex fori solely
on the ground that the applicable foreign law was not pleaded or proved.
One may assume a kind of counterpart to the "public policy" concept
which, in exceptional cases, insists upon application of the lex fori.
Similarly, there are situations in which application of the foreign law
is required under all circumstances.
125. See cases cited in CHESHiRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 250 et seq.; STUMBERO, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 209 et seq.; The King v. International Trustee [1937] A. C. 500, 529
(H. L.) ; Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A. C. 277 (P. C.), (1940) 40
COL. L. REv. 518; Bosemann v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U. S. 196 (1937).
For a list of civil law cases see HAUDEK, DIE BEDEUTUNG DES PARTEMILLENS Il INT.
PRIVATMECHT (1931) 46.
126. This writer's long experience with arbitration has yielded only two cases in
which arbitration tribunals discussed Conflicts problems: the award against the Soviet
Government in the Lena Goldfield case, London Times, Sept. 3, 1930, and the Hamburg
award reported in Hanseatsche Rechts- und Gerichtszeitschrift 1931 B no. 142.
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One group of such situations relates to rights originating in foreign
familial and inheritance relations. It hardly need be said that the foreign
law governing divorce, or annulment of marriage, cannot be replaced
by the lex fori merely because of failure to plead or to ascertain the
foreign law. The same can probably be said of property litigation origin-
ating in familial and inheritance situations. Where personal property,
belonging to a foreign decedent's estate, was found within the jurisdic-
tion of the forum where it was claimed by an alleged representative of
the decedent, an American court has held application of the hex fori t,,
be out of the question although there was no proof of foreign law." '
Nor was the court in the German case discussed above ' s prepared to
hold a person liable for debts of a deceased alien non-resident on the
ground that he would be liable for these debts under German law. And
where an illegitimate child sued his alleged father for maintenance in a
Dutch court and the facts clearly indicated that Swiss law should control
the situation, the Dutch court refused to render judgment for the plaintiff
on the basis of Dutch law, even though Swiss law was not pleaded.m'
These decisions are explained by the well-known disparities existing
between the inheritance and maintenance laws of the various countries.
There is the additional consideration in inheritance and familial cases that
the judgment, in fact or in law, may have disturbing effects beyond the
immediate objects of the litigation.
The consciousness of far-reaching disparities between local enactments
may also lie behind the reluctance of American courts when, in wrongful
death actions for wrong done abroad where the foreign law is not
proved, they hesitate to resort to application of the local wrongful death
statute;'3° the strength of the common law tradition disfavoring these
actions might be another factor. 3 American courts are also hesitant
to inflict forfeitures or penalties in foreign situations under the law of
the forum where there is no proof of the applicable foreign law.13-
127. Leach v. Pillsbury, 15 N. H. 137 (1844). In this case the property was claimed
by an attaching creditor of the alleged representative.
128. See p. 1036 supra.
129. Supreme Court of the Netherlands, March 20, 1931, Nederland'sche Jurispru-
dentie 1931, 890.
130. Even where the parties were apparently citizens of the forum. Ryan v. North
Alaska Salmon Co., 153 Cal. 438, 95 Pac. 862 (1908) ; Rositzki v. Rositzki, 327 Mo. 662,
46 S. W. (2d) 591 (1931). But cf. Grow v. Oregon Short Line, 44 Utah 160, 133 Pac.
398 (1913). 3 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1684 cannot be followed in remarking that
the Rositzki case might well provide a foundation for overruling earlier cases to the con-
trary; see also Comment (1932) 10 TENN. L. REV. 306.
131. This motive was explicitly referred to in Murray's Adm'x v. Louisville & N.
Ry., 132 Ky. 336, 110 S. V. 334 (1908).
132. Harris v. White, 81 N. Y. 532, 544 (1880); Westheimer v. Habinck, 131 Iowa
643, 109 N. W. 189 (1906); Grow v. Oregon Short Line, 44 Utah 160, 138 Pac. 393
(1913).
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The individual views of the court will always constitute a major factor
in the drawing of the borderline between what might be called the "abso-
lute" and the "relative" foreign law cases, but they will not affect the
validity of the basic conception: that in the absence of proof of the
foreign law, and particularly in the absence of reference to foreign law
by the parties, a court should apply its own law when substantial justice
can thereby be attained. 133
While this proposition retains, on the whole, the valuable results of
judicial practice, the departure from the presumption doctrine is by no
means merely theoretical. In the interstate area the substantial justice
proposition coincides with the doctrine which applies the statutory law
of the forum rather than foreign law. In the international field it liber-
alizes the rule which tries to restrict the use of the lex fori to "universally
recognized fundamental principles of right or wrong." Instead, it would
make application of the lex fori the principle whenever foreign law is
not pleaded or not proved.
Another difference between the theories is in the matter of burden of
proof. The presumption theory has been blamed for unduly shifting the
plaintiff's burden of proof to the defendant.' Where, for example, a
foreign contract is valid under the law of the forum, an alleged invalidity
flowing from the foreign law must be proved by the defendant, according
to the presumption doctrine, although it is for the plaintiff originally
to prove the existence of a valid cause of action. While it must be ad-
mitted that the inversion of the burden of proof which results from
applying the presumption doctrine is too mechanical a solution, it is still
not desirable to assume with some critics of the presumption theory
that the burden of proof of foreign law invariably goes along with the
burden of proving the original cause of action (or, in some cases, of
proving the defense). Professor Beale, one of those who criticize the
presumption doctrine, approves the Crosby case"" in which the Court,
refraining from any presumption, decided against the plaintiff because
he had neglected to prove the Cuban law. But it is precisely this point
which leaves the reader of the case with a particular feeling of dissatis-
faction. 3 ' It would have been easy for the Cuban Railroad to plead and
133. In Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. 146 (N. Y. 1811) a suit had been brought
upon a promissory note executed in Jamaica by the defendant who was then not yet
twenty-one years old. Chancellor Kent gave judgment for the plaintiff because the
defendant, having failed to prove the law of Jamaica, had not made out his defense of
infancy. The decision was perhaps actuated by a desire of the Chancellor to do "sub-
stantial justice" under the circumstances. Yet unless foreign law had been employed,
substantial justice could only have been done within the bounds of the lex tori, which
would have demanded the dismissal of the complaint.
134. Kales, supra note 104, at 412; 3 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1681.
135. Id. at 1678, 1682.
136. See Note (1912) 38 L. R. A. (N.s.) 40.
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prove the foreign law with respect to questions familiar to railway man-
agement. The fact that the company failed to do so gives rise to the
surmise that the Cuban law favored the plaintiff. In such a situation it
would be sound policy to expect the defendant to prove the foreign law.
Application of American law rather than the harsh dismissal of the cum-
plaint would have been quite feasible and proper since all the parties were
apparently Americans -a point immaterial from the viewpoint of the
presumption doctrine, as well as under the rigid theory of the Court,
but important from the standpoint of substantial justice1 3T Where the
latter theory is employed, the burden of proof as to foreign law will
depend entirely upon the circumstances of the case, and may be used as
another flexible instrumentality for avoiding undesirable dismissals.
It is true that the continental internationalist doctrine is even more
remote than the presumption theory from the point of view taken by
the writer. This may be shown by a post-war German case which turned
on a contract for the shipping of goods from Bolzano (Italy) to Kufstein
(Austrian town at the German frontier). Neither the plaintiff, the
Bolzano shipping firm, nor the defendant, a German citizen and resident,
had pleaded foreign law. The Appellate Court decided the ease on the
basis of German law. The Reiclsgericht reversed, directing that the case
be disposed of on the basis of Italian law, solely on the ground that
Bolzano was the "place of performance." There would be a point to the
application of Italian law if, say, German law was not suited to a question
of Alpine transportation. But such a question did not arise.ias It certainly
could not be said that resort to German law was obviously unfair to the
parties: the plaintiff himself had applied to German courts, without relying
on non-German law, 39 and the defendant was a German national and resi-
dent. The Reichsgericht's point was simply dictated by internationalist
doctrine: the court as well as the parties had become the slave of some
mysterious supranational ruler exacting strict obedience without pausing
to consider the best interests of the parties as felt by themselves and by
137. Similar objections apply to the majority opinion in Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp.,
245 N. Y. 152, 156 N. E. 647 (1927). Oil was allegedly converted in Mexico by the
defendant, an American corporation owning tremendous oil interests in Mexico; the
plaintiff, too, was apparently an American. The complaint was dismissed because the
plaintiff had not proved the Mexican law on conversion. Crane and Pound, JJ. dissented,
because the action was based upon a "fundamental proposition" warranting, by way of
presumption, the application of American law.
138. judgment of Oct. 8, 1924, Warneyers Rcchtsprechung 1925, 48. The sections
on transportation and many other matters in the German Commercial Code of 1897 are
merely an amended edition of the General German Commercial Code of 1861, adopted
also by Austria.
139. Except that the plaintiff had invoked the Austrian Commercial Code, then still
in force in Bolzano, as the statute of limitation, but this point wvas not stressed by the
court.
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the lower courts. 4 ' To top it all, such obedience was demanded in the
name of the place-of-performance theory of contracts, one of the most
questionable issues in Private International Law.
Rejection of the internationalist view does not mean that freedom
of courts from binding rules is advocated in all Conflicts situations. The
writer does not agree with some distinguished American authors who,
on the basis of a "local law theory," would determine the applicable law
in each Conflicts situation according to the forum's own views on justice
or on general social or economic policy. 4' To the extent that Conflicts
rules have evolved judicially or otherwise they must be obeyed in the same
way as other rules of law. The present study is confined to the situation
in which the applicable foreign law has not been proven. Under these
circumstances the suggestion is that, except in a relatively small number
of exceptional cases, the law of the forum should be applied, rather than
the complaint dismissed. As the issue has been dominated by theories
and slogans which are widely recognized as antiquated and confusing,
recourse to fundamental principles has now become necessary. Such
recourse may temporarily carry with it vagueness and uncertainty which,
however, are equally apparent under the present erroneous doctrines.
Should it be possible to reconstruct a sound juridical basis, one may hope
that the courts will develop satisfactory precedents and thereby gradually
develop a new certainty.
140. Similar views have been advanced by the Reichsgericht, Jan. 30, 1889, 23
ENTSCHEIDUNGEr IN ZIVI.SACHEN 31, 34; May 24, 1921, 102 id. 214.
141. The "vested right" doctrine is incompatible with the "substantial justice" theory
of the present Article as well as with the presumption theory. Either theory runs counter
to the "territoriality" principle which connects the "vested right" with a given territory.
It is for this reason that Professor Beale approves of the unsatisfactory tenets of the
Crosby case and the Rositski case, smpra note 130. In fact, the proof-of-foreign-law
situation furnishes another point against the vested right doctrine.
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